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First,wesini tint the Interest rate on Feleral fuels is extrenely
informative atciut future ncverents of real macroannnlc variables, sore so
than nnnetary aggregates or other interest rates. Next, we argue that the
reason for this foreastin ss i tji the fist rate sensitively
rrds shocks to the sztly of (mDt the dananl for) bank reserves, i.e. the
tunis rate is a goal irdicator of nzmtary policy acticr. Finally, using
iniriaticris to the fuels rate as a neas.ire of dwqes in ucinetazy policy, we
present evidejre onrisistent with the via that nerEtary policy werks at least
in part thra4i "crelit"(thatis, bait loans) as well as thn4i "enney"
(that is, bank dOeJ±S) —even thc*sgh bank loans fail tn Granger-cause real
variables.
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Woakcw Wilson Sdcol tpnrbnent of Eniics of FVblic & International Affairs Priiretai University Prircetcn University Prirraton, IC 08544—1021 Prirceton, IC 08544Does monetary policy affect the teal economy? And if so, what is the
transmission mechanism through which these effects occur? These two questions
are among the most important and controversial in macroeconomics. This paper
presecta some new empirical evidence that bears on each.
Our original motivation for undertaking the research reported here was
far more modest than is suggeated by the two queationa raised above; itwasto
test a model of monetary policy transmission sketched in Ben S. Bernanke and
Alan S. Blinder (1988). There we developed an analogue to the simple IS-tM
model which embodied an unconventional (but rather old) view of the monetary
transmission mechanism; that central bank policy works by effecting bank
assets ("loans") as well as bank liabilities ("deposits").
The microeconomic justification of this so-called credit view is the
observation that, under realistic conditions of asymmetric information, loans
from financial intermediaries are "special." Specifically, the expertise
acquired by banks in the process of evaluating and screening spplicsnts and in
monitoring loan performance enables them to extend credit to customers who
find it difficult or impossible to obtsin credit on the open market. As a
consequence, when the Federal Reserve reduces the volume of reserves, and
therefore of loans, spending by customers who depend on bank credit must fall,
and therefore so must aggregate demand.1 This provides an additional channel
of transmission for Federal Reserve policy to the real economy, over and above
the usual liquidity effects smsnating from the market for deposits.2
Until now, the credit view has been perceived as unsuccessful
empirically. One apparently damaging piece of evidence is the finding that
bank deposits are better predictors of output changes in unrestricted vector
autoregressions than are bank assets (Stephen R. king (1986)). However, it is
2extremely risky to make structural inferences from unrestricced vector
autoregressions which, after all! are only reduced forms, If we want to
measure the true structural effects of a policy change, there are really only
two alternatives.
First, we can specify and estimate a structural economic model. Thus
Bernanke (1956) used a "structural vector autoregression approach" to study
the relationships among money, credit, and income, and obtained a more
optimistic reading on the importance of credit, Unfortunately. inferences
drawn from structural models are typically sensitive to the choice of
specification and to the identifying assuitptiona. For example, Bernanke
imposed covariance restrictions to get identification.
The second alternative is to try toisolatea direct measure of Federal
Reserve policy. Suppose, for example, that we could find a variable whose
innovations could be interpreted as "policy shocks. •(Thesystematic portion
ofthe variable could depend in any arbitrary fashion on lagged economic
variables.)Suppose further that, perhaps because of information lags, these
measurablepolicy shocks could reasonably be assumed to he independentof
contemporaneous economic disturbances. Then the reduced-form responses of the
economy to observed policy shocks would correctly measure the dynamic
structuraleffects of a monetary policy change. This second strategy is the
one we follow in this paper.
Specifically, think of the economy as being represented by the following
very general structural modeU
(I) Y
— + S1Y,1+CP÷C1P1+u
(2) Pt — ÷IJYti÷ GP1÷
where Y is a vector of nonpolicy variables, P is a vector of policy variables,and u and v are orthogonal disturbances. The system (l)-(2) is obviously not
identified. Two typesofidentifying assumptions are most obvious.
The preceding discusaion suggests excluding Y from (2), which means
assuming there is no feedback from the economy to policy actions within the
period. If D0—O, we can convert this system into a standard vector
autoregression (VAR) by substituting (2) into (1) and solving for to
obtain:
(3)Pt —DY51+GP1+v.
(t)Y —(IB)'1[(B1+ CoD)Yti +(C0G+C1)?1+u+
C0v}
-
Inthis case, the effects of policy innovations on the nonpolicy variables can
be unanbiguously identified with the impulse response function of Y to past
changes in v in the unrestricted VAR consisting of (3) and (4), with P placed
fun in the ordering.
An alternative identifying assumption is to suppose that contemporaneous
P does not enter equation (1), that is, that C5—O, so that policy actions
affect real variables only with a lag. In this case, the appropriate VAR has P
Jfinthe ordering, via:
(3') t— (IBy1[B,; + C1P +ut).
— (0+ D5(I-B5) 15,)Y + (C + DQ(I -Bo)Ci)Pi+
+
Here v is still a policy innovation, but P is now also affected by
contemporaneous macro shocks, u1
In this paper, we make some use of each of these two alternatives. In
either case, we entertain the idea that the Federal funds rate (or the spread
between the funds rate and some alternative open market rate) is an indicator
4of Federal Resent policy--at least before october 1979 If so, the dynamic
responseof the economy to innovations in the funds race, or in the funds rate
spread, will measure the true structural responae to monetary policy. In
particular, we can "see" themonetarytransmission mechanism unfold by
examining the responses of bank balance sheet variables, like deposita and
loans, and target variables, like unemployment and inflation, to a Federal
funds rate shock.
Before doing this, however, we must defend the idea that the funds rate,
or the funds rate spread, is a measure of monetary polity. This we do in
three steps.
First, if the funds rate is a measure of monetary policy and if monetary
policy affects the real economy--two conclusions that this paper
supports--then the funds rate should be a good reduced-form predictor of major
macroeconomic variables. We therefore begin in Section 1 by studying the
information content of the Federal funds rate, The results we obtain are
striking: The Federal funds rate is markedly superior to both monetary
aggregates and to most other interest rates as a forecaster of the economy.3
This is an important finding even to those who ste skeptical about the rest of
our analysis, because it challenges a recent argument of Christopher A. Sims
(1980), Robert B. Litterman and Laurence Weiss (1985), and other "real
business cycle" advocates that the predictive power of interest rates is due
to real, rather than monetary, factors. Why, if the real business cycle view
is correct, does the Federal funds rate predict real output better than other
open-market interest rates?
Second, if the Federal funds rate measures monetary policy, as we claim,
then it should respond to the Federal Reseres's percption of the state of the
5economy. Our next step (Section II), therefore, is to estimate monetary
policy reaction functions explaining movenants in the funds rate or the funds
rate spread by lagged target variables, as in equation (2). As an
alternative, we also try a latent variable approach adapted from Robert B.
Avery (1979). In all cases, we obtain plausible results which suggest that
the Fed was purposefully manipulating the funda rate during the pre-1979
period- -an observation that is consistent with what the Fed claims to have
heen doing during that time.
-
Finally,in Section III, we make the case that movements in the funds
rate are genuine policy changes, not simply endogenous responses of the
Federal funds market to changes in the economy. This boils down to showing
that the supply curve of nonborrowed reserves between FOLIO meetings is
extremely elastic at the target funds rate. Uaing both monthly and weekly
data, we find little effect of reserve demand shocks on the funda rate, which
supports the idea that the funds rate is mostly driven by policy decisions.
Given all this evidence, we consider it reasonable to treat either the
funds rate or the funds rate spread as a measure of Federal Reserve policy
which, though not statistically exogenous, is at least predetermined within
themonth. We therefore interpret the estimated dynamic responses of the
economy to shocks to these alternative policy measures as reflecting the
structuraleffect of monetery polity in the particular historical period under
study.4
In doing this, we reach twomainconclusions. First, monetary policy
does seem to effect the real economy; a variety of meaeuree of real activity
respond to shocks to the Federal funds rate (Section 1).
Second, there appears to be something to the idea that monetarytransmission works through bank loans as wall as through deposits (Section
IV). Loans seem to respond slowly to monetary polity innovations--which makes
economic sense because loans are contractual commitments, and whith also
explains why loans are not as useful as deposits in forecasting. But loans do
eventually respond substantially to a thange in the funds rate, with a timing
that coincides closely to the response of the unemployment rate. This
coincidence in time does not prove that loans tarry the impact of monetary
policy to the real economy; an alternative explanation, which we discuss in
Section IV, is that loan volume passively adjusts to economic activity.
Nonetheless, the timing seems to us to be strikingly consistent with the
credit view.
I.The Information Content of the Federal FundsPat.
Eoathoc ergo procter hoc fallacies notwithstanding,5 much of the
empirical case for the real effects of moneyhas been based on the observation
that movements in monetary aggregates precede movements in the real economy
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1963) were, of course, the first to
document this relationship extensively. Leonall Andersen and Jerry Jordan
(1968) showed that money was a better predictot of CNP than fiscal variables,
Sims (1972) demonstrated that money Grsnger-causes nominal CNP in a bivariate
system; and Lawrence J. Cbristiano and tars Ljungqvist (1988) have recently
produced parsllel findings for industrial production. If money is at least
partly exogenous, these results suggest that changes in nominal money can be
used to produce real effects.
In the late 1970's, attention focused on whether itwas"anticipated" or
"unanticipated" money that leads output. Robert J. Barro (1977,1978) presentedempirical evidence for unanticipated money; Robert J. Gordon (1982) and
Frederic S. Mishkin (1982) made rebuttals. The distinction between
anticipated and unanticipated money was important for deciding whether
systematic monetary policy could affect output. However, this entire debate
presumed that the tendency ofmoneyto lead output implied some type of causal
relation,
More recent empirical work has questioned precisely this supposition.
First Sims (1980) and then Litterman and Weiss (1985) found that interest
rates tend to abaorb the predictive power of money. Specifically-, a nominal
interest rate appears to dominate money as a forecaster of output when added
to a vector autoregression containing money, output, and prices. These
authors interpreted this finding as evidence against the effectiveness of
monetary policy, whether systematic or non-systematic. This interpretation
was disputed on empirical grounds by King (1982) and Bernenks (1986) and on
theoretical grounds by Bennett T. McGallum (1983). Nevertheleaa, the apparent
fact that money has far less predictive power for output than do interest
rates is an important challenge to the traditional "money leada income"
argument for monetary policy effectiveness,
This section picks up and supporta a suggestion made by McGallun (1983),
who argued that the Sims result need not imply that monetary policy is
ineffective. Interest rates sight in fact, be better indicators of policy
actions than the monetary aggregates. If Mccallumt is right, it seems to us
that the Federe]. funds rate should be a better information variable than other
open-market interest rates because it is tied so closely to Federal Reserve
policy.6 This section shows that this is indeed the case.
In reconsidering the question of predictive power, we take a more
acomprehensive view of the matter than previous literature has, In particular,
we consider nine different real variables one might want to forecast (listed
in Table I). three different interest rates, and two different meaures of
forecasting power. We also vary the details of the tests in many ways in order
to assess the robustness of the results,
We begin with a battery of Granger-causality tests reported in Table 1.
Each row of the table represents an equation that forecasts some measure cf
real economic activit by six lags of itself, six lags of the log of the
Consumer Prite Index, six lags of the logs of both Ml and HZ. and six lags
each of three different interest rates-- the Federal fonda rate (FUNDS), the
three-month Treasury bill rate (BILL),andthe ten-year Treasury bond rate
(BOND),9 Our focus, of course, is on the predictive power of money and
interest rates. Lags of the price level are included for comparability with
previous literature and because it is presumably moneyand/or ngl
interest rates that affect real variables.10
The table shows the marginal significance levels for the hypothesis that
all lags of either a monetary aggregate or a particular interest rate can be
excluded from the equation predicting a real variable. A small value thus
indicates that the column variable is important for predicting the row
variable. All data are seasonally adjusted. The sample period runs from
1959:7 to 1989:12.12
Table 1 shows that, according to the Granger-causality triterion, the
Federal funds rare is far and away the best predictive variable among the five
considered. It is superior to Ml, M2, and the Treasury bill rate in predicting
every one of the nine macroeconomic variables; in fact, Ml has virtually no
predictive power at all. The funda rate is also superior to the bond rate in
9Table 1. Marginal significance levels of monetary
indicators for forecasting alternative
measures of economic activity: six-variable
prediction equations
Sample period: 1959;7 to 1989:12
Forecasted variable Ml 1(2 BILL BOND FUNDS
1. Industrial
production 0.92 0.10 0.071 0.260.017
2. capacity
utilization 0.74 0.22 0.160.400.031
3. Employment 0.45 0.27 0.0040 0.085 0.0004
4. Unemployment rate 0.96 0.37 0.0005 0.024 0.0001
5. Housing starts 0.50 0.32 0.520.014 0.22
6. Personal income 0.38 0.24 0.35 0.590.049
7. Retail sales 0.64 0.0360.330.740.014
a. consumption 0.96 0.11 0.120.460.0052
9. Durable goods
orders 0.87 0.22 0.280.190.039
NOTES: For each forecasted variable, the entries across
each row are the marginal significance levels for omitting
six lags of the monetary indicator shown in the column
heading from an unrestricted OLS prediction equation that
also included a constant, six lags of the forecasted
variable, and six lags of the CPI. Data are monthly. Ml,
1(2, industrial production, employment, and housing starts
are in log levels. Personal income, retail sales, and
consumption are deflated and in log levels. The data are
from DRI database; see the appendix for details.
FUNDS is the Federal funds rate; BILL is the three—
month Treasury bill rate; BOND is the ten—year government
bond rate.eight of nine cases. FUNDS does well not only relatively, hut also on an
absolute standard. Even in the presence of Xl, M2, two other interest rates,
prices, and the lagged dependent variable, the Federal funds rate's predictive
contribution is statistically significant at better than the 5 percent tevei.
for every variable except housing starts. No other monetary variable is
significant at this level more than twice,
The preceding restalta are quite robust. While precise numbers vary as
the details of the equations are chsnged, the clear superiority of the Federal
funds rate aa a forecaster survives when we use non-seasonally-adjusted data;
when we first-difference the nonstacionary variables;13 when we use three,
four, or twelve lsgs in the forecasting equations rather than six; when we add
a time trend to the regressions; when we omit one of the Ms from the equation;
and when we vary the sample. Two examples of the latter are particularly
interesting.
First, it is well known- -or. rather widely believed- -that the Federal
Reserve reduced its reliance on the Federal funds rate as an intermediate
target in October 1979. So it might be surmised that the predictive power of
the funds rate would be even stronger in a subsample that ends in September
1979. Table 2, which excludes data after September 1979 but is otherwise
identical to Table 1, shows that this conjecture is generally true. Despite
the smaller sample size, FUNDS performs better as a predictor (as measured by
F tests) in the pre-Volcker sample (compared to the full sample) in seven
cases and worse in only one. More important, however, it is once again
superior to NI, M2, snd BILL in forecasting all nine variables, and superior
to BOND for eight variables.
Second, the funds rate may have been a lass important monetary
10Table 2. Marginal significance levels of monetary
indicators for forecasting alternative
measures of economic activity: six—variable
prediction equations
Sample period: 1959:7 to 1979:12
Forecasted variable_i(L M2 BILLBOND FUNDS
1. Industrial
production 0.99 0.0840.0092 0.61 0.0001
a. capacity
utilization 0.96 0.40 0.0250.19 0.0003
3. Employment 0.57 0.41 0.0005 0.15 0.0004
4. Unemployment rate 0.56 0.88 0.0006 0.13 0.0000
5. Housing starts 0.34 0.17 0.73 0.72 0.11
6. Personal income 0.43 0.0950.20 0.91 0.037
7. Retail sales 0.96 0.86 0.27 0.050 0.061
8. Consumption 0.79 0.0170.0100.050 0.0000
9. Durable goods
orders 0.0800.0300.014 0.0071 0.0002
NOTES: See notes to Table 1.instrument before 1966- -a period during which it was generally below the
discount rate.14 If so, the funds rate should be even more informative in
regressions which begin in January 1966. In fsct, however, when we ran such
regressions (not shown) the funds rate's forecasting ability (as measured by F
tests) generally declined compared to that in the full sample. But that may be
due to the smaller sample size. In the 1966-1989 sample, FUNDS remains
superior to both Ml and BILL in forecssting all nine variables and is superior
to BOND in eight of nine cases.
So far we have been using Crsnger-csusality tests to assess "predictive
power." There is at least one serious drawback to this spproach which srises -
becausethe righthand variables era not orthogonal. A stylized example will
illustrate the potential problem. Suppose, say, that Ml was truly an exogenous
policy variable which moved the Treasury bill rate (BILL), which in turn moved
the real economy. Then Ml might be insignificant in a regression that includes
BILL even though it is the genuine driving force.
This is one reason why Sims (1980) and Littermsn-Weiss (1985) focused on
a different measure of predictive power, one that is constructed from a VAR
with orthogonslized residuals: the percentage of the variance of the
forecasted variable attributable to alternative rihr-hand side variables at
different horizons. This metric also has its drawbacks, including dependence
on the ordering of the explanatory variables15, dependence on the horizon,
and low levels of statistical sgnificsnce (see David E. P.unkle (1985)). But,
rather then carry on a pointless debate over which measure is superior, let us
just say that each conveys somewhat different information.
Fortunately, the choice of metric is not terribly important to our
conclusions, as Tables 3 and 4 show. These results are based on exactly the
11same data, samples, and specification as are Tables 1 and 2, except that the
variance decomposition exercise requirea that we eatizate complete vector
autoregressions, rather than single equations. Thus each row in the table
summarizes a complete VAR which includes six lags each of the variable to be
forecast, the price level, the two Ma, and the three interest rates. The
entries in the table are the percentage of variance of the row variable
attributable to each of the column variables at a 24-month horizon. Variables
were ordered in the way they appear in the table; thus we handicap FUNDS by
always placing it last among the five policy variables.
The results here are slightly less dramatic than the Cranger-causality
results. But they still strongly support the view that the Federal funds rate
is an informative variable. -
Lookfirst at Table 3, which pertains to the full 1959-1939 sample.
Despite its disadvantageous position, FUNDS still contributes more to the
twenty-four month variances of industrial production, capacity utilization,
employment, unemployment, and orders for durable goods than any other variable
except the the foretasted variable itself. If we compare FUNDS to the other
four monetary-policy variables, we aee that it outperforms M2 in every caae
(generally by very wide margina), and Ml and BOND in every case but one.
However, by this metric. FUNDShasmore predictive power than BILLforonly
six of the nine variables (versua eight in Table 1).
Table 4 offers corresponding results restricted to the pre-Volcker
sample; it is thus directly comparable to Table 2. Tn thia shorter sample, the
Federal funds rate is the moat informative eingle variable for forecaating the
same five real variables as in Table 3. It outperforms both monetary
aggregates in every case, outperforms BILL in seven of nine caaea, and BOND in
12Table 3. Variance decompositions of forecasted variables
Sample period: 1959:7 to 1989:12
foncastedvariableOwn Lags flMi_.}jjBOND Y2NDS
1. Industrial
production 36.6 3.115.4 8.78.0 0.827.4
2. Capacity utilization 39.7 1.321.0 3.59.5 1.723.3
3. Employment 38.9 7.010.5 0.69.8 2.730.6
4. Unemployment rate 31.9 7.210.5 0,69.9 1.937.9
5. Housing starts 28.8 1.4 3.9 1.8 38.6 14.311.2
6. Personal income 48.2 4.320.8 0.16.9 3.316.3
7. Retail sales 32.415.5 5.1 4.4 27.4 1.114.1
8. Consumption 18.213.116.0 2.2 28.4 5.316.8
9. Durable goods
orders 41.3 6.814.7 5.5 10.3 2.618.8
NOTE: Entries are the percentage of the variance of the
forecasted variable accounted for by variation in the column
variable at a 24—month horizon. Estimates are based on vector
autoregressions with six monthly lags of each variable. The
ordering of the variables in the variance decomposition is the
same as the ordering (left to right) of the columns. See notes
to Table 1.Table 4. Variance decompositions of forecasted variables
Sample period: 1959:7 to 1979:9
Forecasted variable Own Lags CPI Jfj .fl.flflI BOND FUNDS
1. Industrial
production 36.3 2.7 11.8 6.5 11.5 3.327.8
2. Capacity
utilization 39.9 2.4 12.4 4.5 10.8 5.624.3
3. Employment 41.4 l.a5.8 0.2 10.4 3.237.9
4. Unemployment rate 44.9 1.34.9 1.3 11.5 2.2 33.8
5. Housing starts 45.2 9.98.3 6.3 11.8 9.6 9.0
6. Personal income 34.5 17.77.0 0.5 11.9 14.913.4
7. Retail sales 49.2 6.09.9 2.7 16.7 4.111.2
8. Consumption 18.9 21.1 13.2 3.3 11.7 16.415.5
9. Durable goods
orders 41.9 1.2 16.9 5.87.9 7.418.9
NOTE: See notes to Tsble 3.six of nine cases. For some variables, the superiority of the funds rate over
other information variables is slim; but for industrial production, capacity
utilization, employment, and unemployment the percentages of variance at
twenty-four months explained by the funds rate are 28, 24, 38, and 34
respectively. No other monetary indicator records such high numbers anywhere
in the table.
Reordering the variables to put the funds rate first among the policy
variables generally (but not always) increases its contribution in the
variance decompositions, as expected. But the increases are pronounced in
only a few cases.16 This suggests that, for most variables and most time
periods, the information contained in the funds rate is nearly orthogonal to
the information in the other forecasting variables.17 Adding a time trend,
changing the sample, and switching to non-sessonslly-adjusted dsts changes
these results relatively little and alters the basic message not at all.
Differencing the nonstationary variables does cause the predictive performance
of FUNDS to deteriorate substantially. But it remains superior to the other
four monetary variables in most cases.
Our resulta so far suggest that much of the information content of
interest races is to be concentrated in one particular interest rate, the
Federal funds rate. This finding is important, since, if it holds up, it
suggests a need for macroeconomiats to turn their attention to shocks
emanating from the market for bank reserves. As we suggested earlier, it is
also consistent with McCallum's (1983) view that monetary policy may have real
effects which are transmitted directly through interest rates, rather than
through monetary aggregates.
However, in the context of work on a new index of leading indicators,
13James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson (1989) have called attention to the
predictive power of twodifferentinterast-rare-based variables: the spread
between the six-month commercial paper rate and the six-month treasury bill
rare (henceforth, CPZILL) and the spread between the ten-year and one-year
Treasury bond rates (henceforth TERN, for term structure). CPBILL has been
found by Stock and Watson and other authors to be particularly informative)
How does the Federal funds rate compare with these alternative interest rate
variables as predictors of the real economy?
Tables 5-7 provide the comparisons. For the full 1961-89 sample2°,
these tables show both Granger-causality test results and variance
decompositions for five monetary and interest rate variables; the Federal
funds tate (FUNDS); the two Stock-Watson variables (CPBII.L and TERN); and the
two monetary aggregates.21 In addition, we continued to include the price
level and lagged values of the dependent variable in every equation.
Table S shows that CPBILI. is overwhelmingly the best information
variable by the Cranger-causality criterion, generally wiping out the
predictive power of FUNDS.22 But Table 6 shows that--even when placed last
in the ordering. -FUNDSia more useful than CPBILL by the variance
decoaposition metric. When FUNDS is placed ahead of CPBILL in the ordering
(Table 7), it not only carries far more information than CPBILL for every
variable, it is actually rhe best single information variable in eight of the
nine cases.24
-
Howshould we interpret these disparate results? Much depends on why
CPBILL is such an informative variable. A natural hypothesis is that CPBILL
is a good predictor because it captures the market's assessment of economy-wide
default risk, Barnanke (1990) argues against this view, however. He points
14Table 5. Marginal significance levels of monetary
indicators for forecasting alternative
measures of economic activity: six—variable
prediction equations
Sample period: 1961:7 to 1989:12




utilization 0.50 0.71 0.0008 0.640.85
3. Employment 0.79 0.82 0.032 0.550.63
4. Unemployment rate 0.47 0.54 0.049 0.530.28
5. Housing starts 0.56 0.23 0.210.380.55
6. personal income 0.40 0.29 0.020 0.370.76
7. Retail sales 0.59 0.16 0.480.960.41
8- consumption o.g 0.53 0.021 0.780.41
9. Durable goods
orders 0.60 0.52 0.021 0.960.39
NOTES: See notes to Table 1, CPBILL is the difference
between the six-month commercial paper rate and the six—
month Treasury bill rate. TEPII is the difference between
the ten—year and one-year governzent bond rates.Table 6. Variance decompositions of forecasted variables
Sample period: 1961:7 to 1989:12
Forecastedvariable J±]_fl_ CPBILLTERN FUNDS Qçfl
1.Industrial
production 13.5 19.6 10.7 11.36.6 34.3 4.0
2. capacity utilization17.0 8.7 14.27.1 18.7 32.5 1.7
3. Employment 16.1 8.6 13.18.0 11.6 37.3 5.3
4.Unemployment rate 6.8 0.914.17.9 18.5 45.0 6.8
5.Housing starts 13.5 3.81.3 47.42.7 30.5 0.8
6. Personal income 18.7 0.14.1 9.71.4 64.3 1.6
7. Retail sales 8.4 2.74.1 33.55.7 38.1 7.4
8. consumption 24.9 1.42.5 36.95.6 22.5 6.2
9. Durable goods
orders 11.9 8.2 11.56.4 12.543.3 6.3
NOTES: See notes to Tables 3 and 5.Table 7. Variance decompositions of forecasted variables
Sample period: 1961:7 to 1989:12
Forecasted variable _ML4L. FUNDSflflCPSILLJQ!?1
1.Industrial
production 13.5 19.6 21.8 0.8 5.934.3 4.0
2. Capacity
utilization 17,0 8.7 30.3 0.98.932.5 1.7
3. Employment 16.1 8.6 26.7 0.16.037.3 s.a
4. Unemployment rate 6.8 0.9 32.9 0.9 6.545.0 6.8
5. Housing starts 13.5 3.8 26.5 22.6 2.330.5 0.8
6. personal income 18.7 0.1 11.0 2.61.654.3 1.6
7. Retail sales 8.4 2.7 30.6 9.83.038.1 7.4
8. Consumption 24.9 1.4 33.3 10.9 0.822.5 6.2
9. Durable good
orders 11.9 8.2 22.6 0.77.143.3 6.3
NOTE: See notes to Tables 3 and 5.out that the default risk on prise commercial paper is virtually zero,25 and
that the correlation of CFBILL with conventional measures of default risk is
surprisingly low. Instead, Bernanke finds evidence for a hypothesis, examined
esther by Timothy Q.Cook(1981), that CPBILL tends to rise moat sharply
during Fed-induced "credit crunches," such as the episodes- of
dieintersediation that occurred during the late 1960s and the 197Da Bernanke
concludes that CFBII.L predicts the future of the real economy largely because
it indicates the stance of monetary policy.26
If this conclusion iscorrect,then the results we obtained when
comparing CFBILL and FUNDS are perfectly sensible. Suppose, for example, that
FUNDS is a measure of monetary policy and that monetary policy works largely
by inducing "credit crunches, •whoseoccurrences are sensitively recorded in
CPBILL. Then FUNDS should lose its marginal forecasting power in regressions
that contain CPBILL because the latter already captures the impact of monetary
policy. At the same time, however, FUNDS should remain informative in a
variance decomposition sense because it is the most direct indicator of
Federal Reserve policy.27 Superiority for CPBILL in a Cranger-causality
senseand for FUNDSin a variance decomposition sense is precisely what we
find in the data. We thus see no conflict between our approach and the
Stock-Watson results.
The finding that FUNDS is an excellent predictor is consistent with our
main thesis: that FUNDS measurós the stance of monecary policy. However,
fluctuations in the funds rate might be caused primarily by variations in the
demand for, rather than the suooly of, bank reserves. For example, unexpected
cash withdrawals will increase banks demands for reserves. In this case, the
information content of the funds rate would not imply any effectiveness of
15monetary policy; it would merely reflect the correlation of the funds rare
with surprises in bank deposits, which in turn carry information about future
developments in the economy.
A conclusive demonstration that short-run movements in the Federal
funds tate are dominated by either demand-side or supply-side forces probably
cannot be made, given the difficulties of econometric identification in a
context in which certeinly expectations and perhaps even game-theoretic
considerations are pertinent. Nevertheless, in the next two sections, we
present evidence that is at least consistent with the view that short-run
variations in the Federal funds rate are mostly attributable to Federal
Reserve policy decisions, not to fluctuations in the demand for reserves,
II. The Federal Reserve's Reaction Function
If the Federal funds rate or some related variable is an indicator of
the Federal Reserve's policy stance, and if the Fed is purposeful and
reasonably consistent in its policy-making, than the funds rate should be
systematically related to important macroeconomic target variables like
unemployment and inflation. In this section we estimate policy reaction
functions in the form of equation (2) that show that this is true. We obtain
similar results with two very different methodologies, which bolsters our
confidence in the conclusion.
First, we suat decide what variable to use to represent the tightness
or ease of monetary policy. The Federal funds rate itself is the most obvious
choice and, for most of our purposes, is quite adequate. So most of the
results in the next two sections use FUNDS as the measure of policy. However,
16FUNDS has one obvious drawback: a apecifio value of the funds rate might
represent "easy money" when general market interest rates are high (say,
because expected inflation is high) but tight money" when general market
interest rates are tow. For most of our work, this problem is unimportant
because we use innovations rather than levels of variables. But, for some
purpoaes, it is uaeful to have a concrete measure of the level of the policy
variable.
Rohert 0. Laurent (1988, 1989) and others have suggested the spread
between the funds rate and a tong-term bond rate as a useful monetary
indttaror, on the grounds that the long rate incorporates the inflationary
expectations component of all interest rates but is relatively insensitive to
short-run variations in monetary tightness or ease. Indeed, the "tilt of the
term structure is a traditional monetary policy indicator that is much
discussed in the financial press. Thus, as an alternative to FUNDS, we also
consider as a monetary indicator the spread because the funds rate and the
ten-year bond rate, which we call FFBOND.28
Figure 1 displays the behavior of both FUNDSandFFBOND from 1959
through 1989. Readers will immediately notice that the two series behave very
simIlarly; not surprisingly, itisthe funds rate, not the bond rate, that
dominates movements in FFBOWD. Official MEEkbusiness cyclepeaks are
indicated by vertical lines inthefigure. Notice that every cyclical peak
since 1959 was preceded by a sustained runup in FFBOND. Furthermore, only two
sustained increases in FFBOND were nfollowedby recessions. The first such
episode, which was long and gradual, ended with the 1966 credit crunch, which
was followed by a "growth recession". The second is the very recent runup























U)graphs show in a very simple way, why the Federal funds rare has so much
predictive power.
The graphs also call attention to the four episodes in this period
selected by Chrisrina Romer and David Romer (1989) as instances in which the
Fed deliberately turned ccntrattionary to fight inflation; these are marked by
the letter R. In three of the four cases, decisione hy the Fed to fight
inflation (as dated by the Romera) were followed by increases in the funds
rate and ihen by recession, The one exception is April 1974, when the funds
rate fell after the Fed decided to fight inflation (according to the Romers) -
Thissort of anecdotal evidence leads us to look for a systematic reaction
function with FFBDND (or some auch aeasure) on the left and inflation (and
perhaps other things) on the right.
As our first way of estimating such a reaction function, we estimated
a series of three-variable VARa using six lags each of one of our measuresof
monetary polity, the prime-age (25-54) male unemployment rate, andthe log of
theCPI. The sample period ends in September 1979, before the Volcker
dc-emphasis of interest rates in the implementation of monetary policy. There
is not much point in displaying detailed estimation results; we only note that
the hypotheses that either lagged unemployment or lagged inflation can be
omitted from the equations predicting FUNDS or FFBDND were always easily
rejected. The lagged state of the economy clearly has a great deal of
predictive power for any of the three funds-rate-based variables.
Instead, Figures 2 end 3 display the implied impulse response functions
ofFUNDS and FFSDND to shocks to unemployment and inflation. The results
looklike plausible reaction functions. Inflation shocks drive up the funds























































































































































































































































































 and then decaying very slowly. Unemployment shocks push the funds rate in the
opposite direction but with somewhat longer lags and smaller magnitudes.30
To our surprise, these relationships in the data did not break down in the
post-1979 period. Reaction functions estimated in the, sane way for the
1979-1989 period looked qualitatively similar.
A latent variable measure of Fed ooljy
A clever variation on the reaction function theme was explored by Avery
(1979), who argued that no single indicator tan fully measure the Feds policy
stance. He therefore proposed to measure monetary policy by means of a
multiple-indicator multiple-cause (MIMIC) model of polity determination.
Specifically, suppose there is some true but unobserved measure of monetary
policy, called y*. The latent variable y* is assumed to be a linear function
of a vector of causal variables X:
(5) y*_(.U
where y* is Txl (T is the sample length), X is Txk, u is a Txl error vector
independent of X. and k is the number of explanatory variables. Equation (5)
should be thought of as the true reaction function, so that X is lagged
unemployment, lagged inflation, etc.
Although y* is not directly observed, assume we have m indicators of y*,
collectively called Z, 1 is a Txm vector which obeys:
(6) Z—yb' 4-v.
Think of 2 as alternative measures of monetary policy, such as various
interest rates or growth rates of financial aggregates. The error matrix, v,
is Txm and is independent of y*, but has an unrestricted covariance matrix.
Even though y* is unobserved, the parameters of (5) and (6) and,
therefore, fitted values of y* can be estimated by maximum likelihood
19techniques, under the assumption of joint normality (see Avery or R. N. Hauser
and A. S. Goldberger (1971)). Avery estimated a rather complicated version of
this model using monthly data from 1955-1975, He used six indicators of
monetary policy, and his explanatory variables included various lags of the
merchandise trade balance and industrial production as well as unemployment
and inflation. Although he obtained reasonable results for his estimated
model, the overidentifying restrictions imposed by (5) and (6) were strongly
rejected,
To obtain alternative estimates of the reaction of monetary policy to
the state of the economy, we estimated a simplified version of Avery's model
over the 1959-1979 sample. We used three indicatora of monetary policy (the
Z'a): the spread between the funds rate and the long-term bond rate (FFSOND),
the spread between the discount rate and the long-term bond rate (DRZOND), and
the annualized real growth rate of non-borrowed reserves, all meaaured in
percentage points.h1 The causal variables (the X's) were the same as in the
previously-estimeted reaction functions: six lags of prime-age male
unemployment and six lags of the CPI,°2 All variables were measured as
deviationa from means, so no constant term was included.
The parameter estimates are identified only up to an arbitrary scaling
factor. As an convenient normalization, we set the coefficient on y* of FFBOND
in (6) equal to unity. With this metric, the reaction function" coefficients
of equation (5) are displayed in Table S. The absolute megnitudea are not
meaningful, but the pattern of response is. As can be seen, these patterns are
similar to those found in the VARs: Increased unemployment loosens policy and
increased inflation tightens it. However, the long lags implied by the
impulse response functions of our estimated VARsmake us worry that our















chi2(22) 40.2 (significance level =0.010)
NOTE: U and INTL are the unemployment rate and the inflation
rate, nessured in decimals. The table reports the effects of U
and INTL on a latent indicator of monetary policy. The chi2
statistic tests the overidentifying restrictions of the model.application of the Avery technique may not allow sufficiently long lags.
Indeed, the chi-square statistic for the overidentifying restrictions of the
model rejects those restrictions, as was the case in Avery's results35
Nonetheless, we pause to ask how closely FFBOND corresponds to our
estimates of the latent-variable measure of monetary polity, y*. To answer
this question, look at equation (6) and suppose that FFBOND is the first
element of the vector 2. If 21 is really the proper measure of policy, then
t'willclosely resemble 21. that is, the error term v1 will have small
eatimated variance, And the same holds for and Z3. Hence the simple
correlations between the fitted values of y* and each 2 should indicate how
closely related to policy" (i.e., to }s eachobservable variable is.
These correlations, which are readily calculable from the estimates, are
0.80 for FFBOND,0,64for DRBOND, and 0.23 for nonborrowed reserve growth.
These numbers say that the two interest-rate indicators, and especially
FFBOND, were closely tied to monetary policy in the pre-Volcker period; but
real reserve growth was not,
Once again, if this model is actually capturing the reaction function,
it should give very different results for the post-1979 period. When
estimated over the period October 1979 to January 1988, the model in fact gave
generally nonsensical results, including many incorrectly-signed coefficients.
Overall, the results of this section lend support to the view that (1)
the Fed tried to "lean against the wind" during the pre-1979 period, and (2)
the Federal funds rate and related variables (especially, perhaps, the spread
between the funds race end the long-term bond rate) are good measures of the
21Fed's policy stance before 1979. The evidence that there was a major shift in
policy goals or strategy after 1979 is more mixed, but is, in any case, less
important for our purposes.
iii. The Supply of and Demand for Bank Reserves
The fact that reasonable reaction functions can be estimated when the
Federal funds rate or a related variable is used as a proxy for the stance of
monetary polity is evidence for the validity of these proxies. tn this
section, we consider a different sort of evidence implied by the behavior of
the Federal funds rate and funds rate spresda within the month.
The thesis of this paper is that innovations in FUNDS help predict the
economy because they measure policy-induced shocks to the supply of reserves.
But the funds rate would not be a good measure of monetary actions, if, as we
noted earlier, its information content stemmed from shocks to reserve
demand- -arising fros changes in the economy- -rather than from shocks to
reserve suonly.
For the funds rate to be a good measure of monetary policy actions, it
must he essentially unresponsive to changes in reserve demand within a given
month, as assumed in system (3)-(4). This amounts to saying that the Federal
Reserve supplies reserves completely elastically, or nearly so, at its target
funds rate. In this section, we present three different types of evidence in
support of the idea that the within-month supply of reserves was extremely
elastic at the target federal funds rate prior to October 1979,
All three pieces of evidence are based on the same ides. We think ofthe
Fed as setting a supply curve for nonhorros'ed reserves for the month or week.
22If the supply curve is horizontal, as in Figure 4a, thenany development
within the period which affects the ffl4fl4 for bank reserves, but which could
not have been contemporaneously known by che Fed, will nec affect the funds
rate. On the other hand, the funds rate will be affected if the supply curve
is not horizontal, as in Figure 4b. In econometric terms, innovations in
vaciables which drive the demand for bank reserves are fts.tni.nents for
consistent estimation of the slope of the supply curve of nonborcowed
reserves
We implemented this idea first by using as instruments the innovations
in the nine matro variables whose predictability was discussed in Section I.
Six different five-variable WARs were run over the period 1959:8 to 1979:9.
Each used three of the nine macro variables37 nonborrowed reserves of
depository institutions, and either FUNDSorFFBOND as a measure of monetary
policy. Innovations from these VARs were then used to estimace the slope of
the supply curve. Specificaily, we regressed the innovation in thepolicy
measure on the innovation in nonborrowed reserves, using the innovations in
the three macro variables as instruments. If the innovations io the macro
variables contain information that the Fed did not have when it set policy for
the month, then the instrumental variables regression should provide an
estimate of the slope ofthereserve supply function,39
With twoalternativemeasures of polity and three sets of instruments,
we have six estimates in all, Results are given in rows 1 through 3 of table
9. (Ignorerow4 for the moment.) Each entry is the number ofpercentage
points the funds rate or funds rate spread moves in response to a one percent
innovation in the level of nonborrowed reserves. Notice that all the estimated





FIgure 1•Witha horizontal supply curve, innovations to required
reserve deaand CD0 #ED)donor affect the funds rate (panel a).







L#V($Table 9. Estimated Slope of Supply Function of Nonhorrowed
Reserves
Instruments FUNDS FFBOND
1. Set A —0.021 —0.011
(0.023) (0.016)
2. Set B —0.0069 —0.0072
(0.0104) (0.0092)
3. Set C —0.014 —0.014
(0.016) (0.016)
4. Personal income revisions -0.043 —0.027
(0.026) (0.017)
NOTES: Entries are the coefficients obtained by regressing the
innovation in the column variable against the innovation in
uriborrowed reserves, using the innovations in the row variables
as instruments. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample
periods are 1959:8-1979:9. except for the personal income
revision, which is 1969:2-1979:9, Instrument set A is industrial
production, capacity utilization, and employment. Instrument set
B is the unemployment rate, housing starts, and real personal
income. Instrument set C is real retail sales, real consumer
expenditures, and real orders for durable goods.precisely. This is consistent with the idea that, prior to 1979, the Fed set
a target funds rate or funds rate spread and supplied reserves elasticaLly as
required.
One problem with using the VAR innovations of the macro variables is
that our information sot is presumably smaller than that used bytheFed, so
policy-makers might have anticipated some of what we call "innovanions." In
that case, this information might have affected the Fed's decision, and the
identification of the supply curve would be lost,
to avoid this problem, we used an instrument that certainly could not
have been known to the Fed. Specifically, Peter Rathjena (1989) has collected
a data set, which he kindly providod to us, consisting of preliminary
announoements and successive revisions of economic variables. From these data,
we constructed the difference between the preliminary announcement of personal
income for a given month(issuedin the subsequent month) and the second
revised estimate of personal income for the given month (issued two months
later) -Thedifference between the two announcements embodies information
thatwasunavailable to the Fed during the given month, and thus should be a
validinstrument.40
We calculated innovations to the alternative polity indicators and
nonhorrowed reserves using bivariate VARa, then again regressed the innovation
in the policy measure on the innovation in nonborrowed reserves, this time
usingthe difference in personal income announcements as an instrussent. flue to
data availability, this sample began in 1969. The results are shown in row 4
of Table 9.This time the estimated slopes of the reserve supply curves are
negativeand approachstatistical signifioanoe. Again, this is inconsistent
withthe view that the Fed's supply curve of reserves was upward-sloping
24within the month.
Veekly data
As a final wey to estimate the elasticity of reserve supply, we went to
weekly data. The idea was to try to exploit the lagged reserve accounting
system in effect fron September 1968 to January 1984. which made banks' demand
for reserves completely inelastic within the week.
As above, suppose that the Fed's supply curve of nonborrowod reserves
is extremely elastic at the target federal funds tate. In such a world, if
there is a shock to deposits, and hence to required reserves (BR), the funds
rste will respond very little while nonborrowred reserves (NBR) will move
virtually one-for-one with KR. (See Figure 4m.) Eapirically, innovations in FR
should be highly correlated with innovations in NER but virtually uncorrelated
with innovations in the funds rate.
Conversely, if the supply curve of nonborrowed resserves were very
inelastic, as would be the case if the Fed were targeting NBR, then the funds
rate would take up most of the slack while NM would hardly respond. We would
find a strong correlation between innovations in KR and the funds rate, but a
weak correlation between innovations in KR and NM.
What do we actually find in the data? to see, we rsn a VARonweekly
data for required reserves, nonborrowed reserves (both in logs), and the
Federal funds rate. Twelve weekly lsgs of each variable were used, end the
ssisple period was from January 1969 (corresponding to the beginning of lagged
reserve accounting) until the end of September 1979 (when operating procedures
changed). We interpret the innovations to this VARas"shocks" to the
variables.
As predicted by the theory for an interest-rate targeting regime, the
25correlation between shocks to required and nonborrowed reserves was fairly
high during this period (.60), while shocks to either required or nonborrowed
reserves were almost uncorrelated with innovations cc the Federal funds rate
(correlations were .14 and -.02, respectively). Estimating the elasticity oi
reserve supply byregressingfunds race innovations on nonborrcwed reserve
innovations, using innovations to required reserves as an instrument, revealed
that a one percentage point shock to the annual growth of HER is associated
with less than a 0.1 basis point movement in the funds rste, with a
c-statistic of 3.2. This is, once again, consistent with the view that the Fed
was targeting the funds rate during the pre-Voloker period.
cie repeated the above exercise for the three-year pericd beginning in
October 1979 to see if the estimated slope would be much larger under the
allegedly monetarist" operating procedures. The two periods differentin
that the standard devistion of the funds rate is about twice as large and the
standard deviation of nonborrowed reserves innovations is only ebout half as
lsrge in 1979-1982 as in 1966-1979. So the policy change seems to have made a
difference. However, the correlation between innovations in ER and HER is
still .45. which is not drastically lower than in the earlier sample. And the
correlation between required reserve innovations and funds rate innovations
rises to .45, which is what would be expected under e nonborrowed reserve
targeting regime. Nonetheless, when we applied our instrumental variables
technique to estimate the slope of the supply curve, the estimate for the
1979-1982 period was 1.3 basis points, or about 13 times aslargeas in
1968.1979. This seems broadly consistent with both the previous finding and
what the Fed was seying.
26IV. The Transmission of Monetary Policy
So far we have argued that the Federal funds rate, or parhapa the spread
between the funds rate and some other interest rate, is agoodindicator of
monetary policy. By this, we mean that short-run fluctuations in the variable
are dominated by shifts in the atance of polity, not by non-policy influences.
Policy actions might well be influenced by past economir conditiona, But it
isimportant for our argument that the polity indicator not be sensitive to
current (that is, within-month) developments in the economy. We have offered
evidence that this is so.
As discussed in the introduction, a variable that ia an indicator of
policy in this sense would be very useful, since it would allow us to trace
out the effects of policy without developing an explicit structural model. If
the funds rate measures policy intentions, and if these intentions are
predetermined, then the reduced-form responses of economic variables to
innovations in the funds rate should measure the effects of policy.
Inthissection, we utilize this idea to study the dynamiceffects of
monetarypolicy actions on bank balance sheets and on the economy in general.
Monthly data on the balance sheets of commercial banks are published by the
Federal Reserve. (See the data eppendix.) Our samplebegins in 1959:1, for
comparabilitywith the other results in this paper, and ends in 1978;l2, when
the Fed changed its definition and the format of its table. This end point,
however, is not a problem for u, since we want to restrict ourselves to the
pre-Volcker period anyway.41
We estimated three different VARs, each including an indicator of
monetary policy based on the funds rate, the unemployment rate, the log of the
CPI, and the log levels of each of three bank balance sheet variables
27(deposits, securities, and loans) all deflated by the C?I.42 As usual six
lags of each variable were used, From each estimated VAR, we calculated the
implied impulse response functions (moving average representations) to a shock
to the monetary indicator. Under the assumption that innovations to the
indicators represent policy actions, the responses of the other five variahtes
will trace out the dynamic effects of such an action on the banking system and
the economy.
The VARcoefficientsthemselves are not very interesting, and so are not
reported. Furtherzocre, since the shapes oftheimpulse response functions are
alnost identical regardleas of whether the funds rate or a funds rate spread
is used as a policy measure, we show only the results using the funds rate.
Figure 5 displays the responses to a one standard deviation (31 basis point)
shock to the funds rate over a horizon of 24 months.43
Tight money (a positive innovation in FUNDS) does indeed reduce the
volume of deposits held by depository institutions, as we would expect. The
effect starts immediately, builds gradually, reaches its peak in shout nine
months, and appears to be permanent.44
The other results bear in an interesting way on the money-versus-credit
controversy. Naturally, bank assets fall along with bank liabilities. But the
composition of the fall is noteworthy. For the first six months or so after
the policy shock, the fall in assets is concentrated almost entirely in
securities; loans hardly move, However, shortly thereafter securities
holdings begin gradually to be rebuilt while loans start to fall, By the time
two years have elapsed (the end of the graph), security holdings have almost
returned to their original value and essentially the entire decline in





























































































































































 This pattern is just what we should expect. Loans arc
quasi-contractual commitments whose stock is difficult to change quickly.
ganks therefcre react to reduced deposits in the short run by selling off
securities. In the longer run, however, portfolios are re-balanced, with the
primary effect (according to these results) falling on loans. Similar results
have been obtained by Leonard I. &aksmura (l98).
To relsre this pattern of portfolio adjustment to developments in the
real economy, Figure 5 also displays the impulse response function of the
uneaplcyment rate. Ac is apparenr, the effects on unemployment are
assenrially zero during the first two or three quarters after the shock to the
funds rate; but at about the nine month point unemployment begins to rise,
building gradually to a peak after about two years before declining back ro
zero (the decline is not shown in the graph)
This timing of the unemploymenr response is inreresring, because it
corresponds fairly well to the estimated timing of the effect of the policy
shock cn loans. The fact that unemployment and bank loans move together
following a change in the funds rate is consistent with the viewchatbank
loans are animportantcomponent of the monetary transmission mechanism, even
though loans do not lead real variables and are therefore nor useful in
forecasting exertises with 'TARs.
There is, however, an alternative interpretation of our resulrs: that
monetary policy works entirely through the conventional money-demand
mechanism, while the observed behavior of loans reflects a purely passive
response to a falling demand for credit. One problem with this interpretation
is that there is no reason for bank portfolios to bear any systematic
relationship to either the stance of monetary policy or the level of real
29activity if loans, government securities, end corporate bonds areperfect
substitutes- -as they are under the traditional 'money only" view.But we have
shown here that the composition of bank portfolios does
respond systematically
to monetary policy. Another related problem for the"money only' view is that
the composition of firma' borrowing also seems to be sensitiveto monetary
policy with losns felling and other means of finance (like commercial
paper)
rising during periods of monetary stringency.45 If the decline in bank losns
following a monetary tightening were simply a passive response tofalling
credit demand, we would expect to see 5jj forms ofcorporate borrowing
declining.
V. Conclualon
This paper draws three msin substantive conclusions.
First, the funds rate (or a aeasure based on it) is a rather good
indicator of monetary policy, even for the period after 1979. The fundsrate
is probably less contaminated by endogenous responses tocontemporaneous
economic conditions than is, say, the money growth rate.
Second, the stylized fact that nominal interest rates are good
forecasters of real variables should be refined to note that the Federal funds
rate is a psrticulay informative variable.46 In fact, the finding that the
Federal funds rate dominates both money and the bill and bond rates in
forecasting real variables seems more robust than the oft-cited finding of
Sims (1980) and Litterman and Weiss (1985) that the bill rate dominatesmoney.
Whether or not one accepts the other arguments of thispaper, this result
stands as a challenge to the real-business-cycle interpretation of the earlier
findings. It needs to be explained.'7
30Finally, our results are consistent with the view that monetary policy
works in part by affecting the composition of bank assets. Tighter monetary
policy results in a short-run selloff ofbankssecurity holdings, with little
effett on loans. Over time, however, the brunt of tight money is felt on
loans,as banks terminate old loans and refuse tomake newones. To the
extent that some borrowers are dependent on bank loans for credit, this
reduced supply of loans can depress the econony The fact that the timing of
the responses of loans and unemployment to monetary policy innovations are so
similaris circumstantial evidence that this channel is operative, even though
loans do not Orenget-cause unemployment.
31DATA APPENDIX
Monthly datg
All data except the Consumer Price Index are frosi DRI and all variables
except interest rate (which do not have significant seasonala) are seasonally
adjusted. Variable definitions and DEl code names follow:
Industrial production index total (JQIND)
Capacity utilization -manufacturing-total(tJCAPFREM)
Employed persona -nonagriculturalestablishments (ERA)
Housing starts -private,including farms (HUSTS)
Retail sales -1982dollars (STR82)
Personal income -1982dollars (YP82)
Nw ordera, manufacturing durables goods -1982dollars (0MD82)
Personal consumption expenditures (C)
Consumer price index (CPIU)
Ml money supply (MNY1)
H2 money supply (MNY2)
Effective rate on federal funds (RIIFEDFIJNDNS)
Average market yield on 3-month government bills (EHC8S3NS) and 6-month
government bills (RNCML6NS)
Rate on prime commercial paper -6months (RNCML6NS)
Yield on Treasury aecuritiea at constant maturity of 1 year (RNCFCM@INS)
and ID years (RNGFCM@IOHS)
32The unemployment rate is measured as:
U11H2(25@54/(LCM2S@34+LCM3S@44+LCM45@54),
or unemployment, male,ages25-54 over the corresponding labor force.
ee1clvdsta
RESFRBNANS Reserves, depository institutions--required,
adjusted
RESFRBNBANSReserves,depository institutions- -nonborrowed, adjusted
RNFEDFUNDSNS Effective rste of Federal funds
Bank balance sheet data
Bank balance sheet data are from Board of Governors, Federal Reserve
System, Banking and Monetary Statistics. l94l-97Q, and Annual Statistical
Digests. The following basic data series all comefromthe table entitled
"Principal assets and liabilitias and number of all commercial banks":
Total loans and investments
Loans
Total deposits
These are last Wednesday of the month series. A dummy variable is used
to correct for a minor definitional change in June 1969, In the regressions,
deposits—total deposits, securities—total loans and investments -bane.All
variables are measured in toga.
An alternative set of data was drawn from Table 1.25 in the Federal
Resene Bulletin, "Assets and Liebilitiee of Commercial Banking Institutions".
Basic balance sheet components used were investment securities (line 2), loans
excluding interbank (line B) ,andtransactions deposits (line 22) -Thesedata
33begin in 1373 and are not exactly comparable to the principal data set because
ofdifferences in definirione end the breakdown of deposits.
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1. The argument is sketched by Blinder and Stiglitz (1983). Note that an
aasuaptton of imperfect substitutahility of loans for seourities in bank
portfolios is needed to ensure that a decline in reserves leads to a decline in
loans.
2. Another implication of thetheoryis that real economic activity will contract
if banks reduce the share of loans in their portfolios (for example, because they
fear bank runs). Bernanke (1983) argues that this may have deepened the Great
Depression.
3. As will be clear later, its chief competitor is a variable based on the
commercial paper rate suggested by Stock and Watson (1989).
4. As we are considering tha responses of the economy in a particular historical
episode, not contemplating the effects of a change in the policy rule, the Lucas
critique does not apply.
5, Tobin (1970).
6. The discount tate might be thought to be tied even more closely to policy.
But it often "follows the marketTM and, perhsps because of its political
sensitivity, it is often held fixed for long periods of time.
7. Litterman (1984) takes more or less the same view in a paper similar in spirit
to, but different in details from, this section.
8. The measures were chosen because the time series are available monthly and
because they are popular indicatora of economic conditions. We report results
for every measure of mggregste activity that was tried.Except for the
unemployment and capacity utilization rates, all variables are measured in log
levels.
9. All interest rates used in this paper are measured as monthly averages of
daily figures, expressed at annual rates.
3910. Oncemany lags are used, there is little difference between putting the price
level or the inflation rate in the equation.
11. Thetablehas no column for the lags of the dependent variable. Such a column
would heve 0.0000 everywhere. The table also omits F-tests for dropping the CFI.
That variable predicts real consumption at the 1 percent level end four other
variables at the 10 percent level.
12. Since money supply data start only in 1959:1, the first usable observation
Ia 1939:7, given the need for sixlags.
13. These ere: industrial production, employment, housing starts, personal
income, retail sales, consumer expenditures, new orders for durable goods, the
price level, Ml, and HZ. If we mechanically first-difference ygythine
(including all three interest rates), neither FUNDS nor the other two interest
rates has much predictive power left. We do not view the latter as a very
sensible procedure, however.
14. This was suggested to us by a referee.
15. As we noted in the introduction, whether the policy variables come before or
after the macroeconomic variables depends on which identifying assumption is
made.
16. Most notably, putting FUNDS first (rather than last) increases it,
percentages of the variance explained from 12.7, 1.0, and 3.2 to 46.2, 40.4, and
45.3 for housing starts, retail sales, and consumer spending, respectively.
17. Putting the five policy variables before the price level and the lagged
dependent variable in the ordering, but keeping FUNDS last among the policy
variables, hardly changes its contributions.
18. Laurent (1988), using quarterly data, finds the funds rate superior to real
M2 growth in predicting real GNF growth. Oddly, however, he does not include
lagged CNP growth in his prediction equations and never uses M2 and the funds
rate together in the same equation.
19. See, in particular, Benjamin A. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner (1989)
"Money, Income, and Prices after the 1980s, NBER Working Paper No. 2852,
February 1990.
20. Data on the six-month commercial paper rate are available only fros 1961.
21. Some might think this competition unfair since CPBILL and TERM are interest
rate soreads while FUNDS is an interest rate jgj. For this reason, we also ran
similar regressions replscing FUNDS by FFBOND, the difference between the Federal
funds rate and the 10-year bond rate. Results were not affected.
22. Similar results are obtained by Bernanke (1990), who pursues the comparison
of these variables in greater detail.
4023. FUNDS is the best single predictor for three variables; C?BILL for none.
FUNDS carries more predictive power than CEBILL in six of the nine cases.
24. The ordering underlying Tables 6 and 7 puts the monetary policy variables (as
a group) first1 followed by ownlagsand the CE'I. However, the results comparing
FUNDS to CPBILL change little if the monetary policy variables are placed last
instead.
25. According tOMoody'sInvestors Service (1989). the historical probability of
2-1 commercial paper defaulting within 270 days is O.004Z: there is only one such
instance of default.
26. Bernanke also argues that TERM, the other Stock-Watson variable, is also a
monetary policy indicator.
27. Note the parallel to our earlier discussion of the relative virtues of the
Crariger-causality and variance decomposition metrics.
28. We also tried the spread between the funds rate and the three-month Treasury
bill rate (FFEILL), which almost always gave results intermediate between FUNDS
and FFBOND.
29. The ordering is: policy variable, unetaployment rare, inflarion rate.
30. Note, however, that the graphs show the impulse responses to one-stand4d
deviation shotks. A one-standard-deviation inflation shock is a much bigger
number (215 basis points, at an annual rate) than a one.standard-deviation
unemployment shock (18 basis points).
31. The results changed little when we used the funds rate and the discount rate
(rather than the spreads) or used nominal rathar than real non-bcrrcwed reserves.
32. Avery's technique does not readily accommodate lagged values of the policy
variable.
33. Avery's method does not produce standard errors for individual coefficients.
34.. In fact, OLS regressions of the funds rate on six lags of unemployment and
inflation (excluding lags cf the funds rate) have highly serially correlated
residuals.
35. With a single latent variable, the overidentifying restrictions are just that
the responses of indicator variables to any given causal variable be in fixed
proportion.
36. This also requires that the lnatrumenrs not be affected by policy within the
month, In terms of equation (1), this mean that C0—0.
37. We used only three variables, rather than all nine, to conserve on degrees
of freedom. Given the use of six lags, these regressions have 30 righthand
variables.
4138. Results using FFBILL were not muchdifferent.
39. Although the innovations are estimated froa a first-stage VAR,theslope
estimates in the second stage are consistent, and the standard error estimates
provided by the instrumental variables procedure are asymptotically correct. This
is because the second-stage parameter estimates and the VAR parameters are
asymptotically independent (the information matrixisblock diagonal), and the
WAlt residuals are consistent estimates of the true disturbances.
40. An alternative is the difference between the initial personal income
announcement end the final revision. However, the final revisions reflect such
thingsas new benchmarks that do not represent new information about the
particular month. -
41.The results were basically unchanged when we used an alternative
balance-sheet series which the Fed began publishing in 1973 and which is still
heing maintained. Again, see the data appendix.
42. In alternative regressions, we used the balance sheet variables in nominal
terms. This made little difference. Results were also similar when we differenced
the data instead of using levels.
43. The policy shocks themselves are transitory. They generally build for about
fourmonthaand then die away rather quickly.
44. Although the diagram stops at 24 months, we ran all the impulse response
functionsout to 48 months.
45. his point is documented end explored in research in progress by Anil ICashyap,
Jeremy Stein, and David Wilcox,
46.The otherparticularly informative variable is Stock and Watson's (1989)
spreadbetween the commercial paper rate and the bill rate.
47. A simple explenation. of course, is that money policy is effective.
42